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THE ANTICIPATORY NUISANCE DOcThINE: ONE COMMON
LAw THEORY FOR USE IN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CASES
SERENA M. WILLIAMS*
Approximately twenty to forty million citizens live within four miles of
America's worst hazardous waste sites.' Proximity to those waste sites is not
without risks.2 However, those sites and the risks associated with them are not
shared equally among this nation's inhabitants. A 1987 study published by the
United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice reported that three out of
every five African and Hispanic Americans lived in communities with
uncontrolled toxic waste sites.' Race is the strongest predictor of location for
commercial hazardous waste activity.'
Unequal distribution of waste facilities is one of many ills included in the
concept of "environmental racism," defined as "racial discrimination in
environmental policy making, [and the unequal] enforcement of [environmental]
regulations and laws."5  The idea that people of color are subjected to
environmental discrimination, that they suffer disproportionately from the
country's environmental degradation, has spawned the environmental justice
movement. Activist groups are waging grass roots campaigns in communities of
color throughout the country; campaigns particularly aimed at halting the location
of toxic waste facilities in their communities.' Although legal actions based on
tort and constitutional law are some of the tactics used by those involved in the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law, Louisville, Kentucky. B.A.,
1981 Smith College; J.D., 1984 Georgetown University Law Center, LL.M., 1992 George
Washington University National Law Center.
1. Karen Breslin, In Our Own Backyards: The Continuing Threat ofHazardous Waste, 101 ENVTL.
HEALTH PEmsP. 484, 484 (1993).
2. "Investigations of some individual sites [have] revealed increases in [the] risk[s] of birth defects,
neurotoxic disorders, leukemia, cardiovascular abnormalities, respiratory and sensory irritation, and
dermatitis .... Elevated exposure levels of lead, PCBs, arsenic, cadmium, chlordane, mercury and
a herbicide have been found in individuals studied at [some] sites." Id. (citing testimony from Barry
Johnson, AssistantAdministrator, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, before Senate
Env't Subcomm., May 1993).
3. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMM'N FOR RACIAL JusTICE, Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL STUDY OF THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMNITmIES WITH HAzARDOuS WASTE SITES xiv (1987) [hereinafter TOxiC WASTES REPORT].
4. Id. at xiii.
5. Karl Grossman, The People of Color Environmental Summit, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION:
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 272, 278 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994)
(quoting Rev. Benjamin Chavis, Jr., then Executive Director of the Commission for Racial Justice).
6. See Luke W. Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A Viewfirom the Field, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1991 (1992).
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movement, many movement participants, including its lawyers, are skeptical about
the effectiveness of using litigation to advance the goals of the movement.7
This article examines the failure of the legal system to provide adequate
relief for plaintiffs seeking redress from environmental discrimination using equal
protection claims. The article then discusses the viability of using the tort theory
of anticipatory nuisance as an alternative to equal protection claims. Part I of this
article discusses the federal response to the issues raised by the environmental
justice movement. It examines several bills that have been introduced in
Congress and comments on the insufficiency of the federal response that has led
sufferers of environmental discrimination to seek redress in the courts. Part II
analyzes the failure of plaintiffs in environmental discrimination cases to succeed
on civil rights and equal protection claims. Proving discriminatory intent has
been an insurmountable burden to those plaintiffs even where courts have found
irreparable harm. Part III introduces the concept of anticipatory nuisance, a
doctrine that would allow successful plaintiffs to prevent the siting of waste
facilities in their communities before the accompanying harm can occur. Under
the doctrine, a defendant may be restrained from conducting an activity where it
is highly probable that the activity will lead to a nuisance causing significant
harm. Part IV presents an evaluation of the use of the anticipatory nuisance
doctrine in environmental justice cases. It concludes that, while the doctrine has
several shortcomings, including the difficulty of proving that a waste facility
would be a nuisance even before its operation commences, it offers plaintiffs a
viable alternative. Whatever its merits, the anticipatory nuisance doctrine,
however, is only a secondary solution; the ideal solution would be to alleviate the
need for hazardous waste dumping sites.
I. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
While some grass root activists rally citizens at local sites to protest the
placement of facilities in communities of color, other activists are focusing on the
7. See, e.g., id. Cole is a staff attorney for the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation and
has represented residents of Kettleman City, California, who were fighting the siting of a toxic
waste incinerator in their town. Id. at 1993.
Among the principles declared at one early conference on environmental justice, the First
National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit held in Washington, D.C., in October
1991, were the following:
[(1)] the right to participate as equal partners at every level of decision-making
including needs assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement and
evaluation;
[(2)] universal protection from ... the extraction, production and disposal of
toxic [and] hazardous wastes; and
[(3)] the rights of victims of environmental injustice to receive full
compensation and reparations for damages as well as quality health care.
Grossman, supra note 5, at 274.
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need for additional empirical investigation and development of aggressive action
plans and enforcement at the federal level.' Three routes have been taken:
congressional legislation, executive order, and uniform enforcement of existing
laws. Although the federal response has included authorizing studies and data
collection and mandating agency strategies for environmental justice, the federal
government has yet to develop an approach to rectify the discriminatory
distribution of environmental risks.' These methods offer affected communities
no redress for harms suffered nor do they grant the individuals in those
communities any legal cause of action under which to fight the placement in their
neighborhoods of unwanted, unsightly, and unhealthy waste dumps. Furthermore,
looking to the federal government for a response leaves citizens dependent upon
who resides in the White House and who is elected to Congress. The 104th
Congress did not make environmental issues a part of the election debate and is
unlikely to emphasize them as part of its congressional agenda. Citizens,
therefore, must continue to use the courts to fight environmental discrimination.
The federal government entered the environmental justice debate in 1983
when District of Columbia Delegate Walter Fauntroy, then Chairman of the
Congressional Black Caucus, directed the United States General Accounting
Office ("GAO") to investigate racial disparity in the siting of hazardous waste
landfills in the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") Region IV. Eight
southern states comprised Region IV: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. The resulting study,
Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their Correlation with Racial and
Economic Status of Surrounding Communities, concluded that three of the four
communities where the hazardous waste landfills were sited were majority African
American." The three communities were 52%, 63%, and 90% African American,
respectively."
In July 1990, EPA Administrator William K. Reilly established the
Environmental Equity Workgroup to review evidence that racial minority and
low-income communities bore a higher environmental risk burden. 2 The
Workgroup was directed to make recommendations for Agency action on
environmental equity. 3 It was formed after Reilly met with the leaders of a 1990
8. See Cole, supra note 6, at 1996.
9. See Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394 (1992).
10. UNIrED STATES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS
AND THEIR CORRELATION wrrH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES
3 (1983).
11. Id. at 4.
12. ENvIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL
COMMUNITIES, PUB. No. 230-R-92-0008, at 2 (1992) [hereinafter EPA REPORT].
13. Id.
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Conference on Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards sponsored by
the University of Michigan School of Natural Resources. 4
The Workgroup issued its report in June 1992, making six findings. 5 It
concluded, among other things, that "[t]here are clear differences between racial
groups in terms of disease and death rates," but that "[t]here [was] limited data
to explain the environmental contribution to these differences."' 6 The notable
exception was lead poisoning; the evidence clearly showed that a significantly
higher percentage of black children than white children have blood lead levels
high enough to cause adverse health effects. 7 The second finding reported that
racial minority and low-income communities experience a greater than average
exposure to selected air pollutants and hazardous waste facilities, but that
exposure did not always result in immediate or acute health effects. 8
The Workgroup made eight recommendations to the EPA Administrator. 9
It suggested, among other things, that EPA increase the priority that it gives to
issues of environmental equity20 and that EPA expand and improve the level of
communication with minority and low-income communities.21 The Workgroup
also recommended that EPA "target opportunities to reduce high concentrations
of risk to specific population groups" by selecting for enforcement action the
most exposed and highly susceptible populations.22 However, it proposed no
statutory solutions for victims of environmental inequity seeking damages for the
harms they have suffered, nor did it propose any way of preventing those harms
before they were incurred by the minority and low-income communities.
With the election of President Clinton came more recommendations
addressing environmental justice concerns, 23 culminating in the issuance of
Executive Order 12,898.24 The Order created an Interagency Working Group on
Environmental Justice to "provide guidance to Federal agencies on criteria for
identifying disproportionately high adverse human health or environmental effects
14. Id. at 6-7.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 11.
17. Id
18. Id. at 12.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id. at 25.
21. Id. at29.
22. Id at 27-28.
23. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE TRANSITION GROUP, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION TEAM FOR THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ON
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ISSUES (1992). The Group recommended, inter alia, that the EPA be
elevated to Cabinet status, that the EPA should target compliance inspections and enforcement to
protect communities of color exposed to disproportionate environmental risks, and that the EPA
should prioritize environmental programs to redress disparate pollution impact. Id. at 6-7.
24. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994).
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on minority populations and low-income populations." The Working Group is
comprised of the heads of over fifteen executive agencies and offices.26 The
Order required each federal agency to develop an environmental justice strategy. 7
Such a strategy would list programs, policies, and rulemakings that should be
revised to promote enforcement of health and environmental statutes in areas with
minority populations and to identify differential patterns of consumption of
natural resources among minority and low-income populations.2"
The President also emphasized provisions of existing law that could aid
in achieving environmental equity.29 For example, when an analysis of
environmental effects is required by the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 ('NEPA"), ° federal agencies shall include an analysis of the effects on
minority and low-income communities: "Mitigation measures outlined or
analyzed in an environmental assessment, environmental impact statement, or
record of decision, whenever feasible, should address significant and adverse
environmental effects of proposed Federal actions on minority communities and
low-income communities."3'
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was also part of the directive to
federal agencies to use existing law.32 Title VI, Nondiscrimination in Federally
Assisted Programs, prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, color, or
national origin in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.33
Each federal agency is to ensure that the programs and activities receiving federal
financial assistance impacting the environment would not use criteria, practices,
or methods that discriminate. 4
25. Id. § 1-102(b).
26. The agencies and offices included the following: the Departments of Defense, Labor,
Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, Justice,
and Energy; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Office of Management and Budget; the
Office of Science and Technology Policy; the National Economic Council; and the Council of
Economic Advisors. Id. § 1-102(a).
27. Id. § 1-103(a).
28. Id.
29. Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 30 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. DOc. 279, 280 (Feb. 11,
1994) [hereinafter MEMO].
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).
31. MEMO, supra note 29, at 279.
32. Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).
34. MEMO, supra note 29. "The EPA has received and accepted ... two complaints alleging racial
discrimination under Title VI .... One of the complaints involves a permit application for a
hazardous waste treatment and storage facility in Iberville Parish, Louisiana. The other complaint,
filed by African Americans for Environmental Justice, involves permit applications for several
facilities in or near Noxubee County, Mississippi." ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
E IR ENTAL JusTIcE INrATrES 1993, PUB. No. 200-R-93-001, at 11 (1994).
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In January of 1994, EPA created an Environmental Justice Federal
Advisory Council.35  The Council was created pursuant to the Federal
Advisory Committee Act 6 to provide advice and information to the EPA
Administrator on domestic environmental justice policies and issues. The Council
is to focus on the areas of enforcement, waste, health and research, and
communication outreach." Members of the Council represent community-based
groups, industry and business, tribal government organizations, academic
institutions, and environmental groups .38
Several bills have been introduced in Congress to address environmental
justice issues, but none has been enacted into law. Senator Baucus of Montana,
Senator Moseley-Braun of Illinois, and Senator Campbell of Colorado introduced
the Environmental Justice Act of 1993 to establish a program to ensure
nondiscriminatory compliance with environmental laws and equal protection of
the public health. 9 Among the findings listed in section 2 of the bill was that
"racial and ethnic minorities and lower income Americans may be
disproportionately exposed to toxic chemicals in their residential and workplace
environments."4 The bill, if passed, would have directed EPA to designate as
Environmental High Impact Areas ("EHIAs") the one hundred counties or other
geographic units with the highest total weight of toxic chemicals released during
the most recent five-year period for which data is available."a Various federal
agencies would have reported on the exposure to toxic chemicals in the EHIAs.42
The President would be required to propose administrative and legislative changes
to prevent such impacts.43 The bill would have allowed EPA to promulgate
35. Environmental Protection Agency, Note to Correspondents, Tuesday, April 12, 1994. The first
community to ask the Council to intervene on its behalf consisted of a group of homeowners in
Texarkana, Texas, who were relocated in 1992 from Carver Terrace, a subdivision built on land
containing toxic chemicals from a wood treatment plant. Marianne Lavelle, Help Sought from
"Green" Justice Panel, NAT'L L.J., Oct 31, 1994, at A16. The homeowners charged that they
were not fairly compensated for the value of their dwellings when the EPA bought out the residents
pursuant to a Congressional mandate. Id. A lawyer for the group alleged that the African
American homeowners were treated differently from white residents of Times Beach, Missouri,
another site from which the federal government relocated residents. Id.
36. Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 445 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §1988, App. I (1988)).
37. Id.
38. Id. For example, those represented include People for Community Recovery of Chicago, Ill.,
Monsanto and Waste Management, Inc., Central Council Tlingit and Haida Tribes of Juneau, Ak.,
and the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund.
39. S. 1161, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Representative John Lewis of Georgia introduced a
similar bill in the House on May 12, 1993. The purpose of H.R. 2105 was to require data collection
on health effects, to identify areas subject to the highest level of toxic chemicals, and to require an
equitable distribution of environmental pollution. H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993).
40. S. 1161 at § 2(3).
41. Id. § 5(d)(1).
42. Id. § 5(d)(3).
43. Id. § 5(d)(4).
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regulations for federal permits for the construction or modification of a toxic
chemical facility in an EHIA.44  The regulations would have required a net
reduction in the release of any toxic chemical causing an adverse impact in the
EH[A 45
Representative Cardiss Collins of Illinois introduced the Environmental
Equal Rights Act of 1993 as an amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act "to
allow petitions to be submitted to prevent certain waste facilities from being
constructed in environmentally disadvantaged communities.146 The Act would
have defined an "environmentally disadvantaged community" as a community
located within two miles of the site of a proposed solid waste facility with a
minority population greater than the particular state's percentage of population of
such individuals or the percentage of the national population for the ethnic
group.47 The bill provided for hearings on the petitions. 8 The petition would be
approved if the petitioner established that the proposed facility would be located
in an environmentally disadvantaged community and would adversely impact the
human health or the air, soil, or water of the community. 9
Representative Barbara Rose Collins of Michigan introduced a bill to
amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act ("CERCLA") 5° of 1993 which would require the Administrator of the Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry to collect and maintain information on
the residents of communities adjacent to areas of toxic substance contamination.51
The information collected would include the race, age, gender, ethnic origin,
income level, educational level and duration of residence of the residents at those
locations.5 2
The Superfund Reform Act of 1994 would also have amended CERCLA
to expand public participation in the cleanup process. 53  The belief that-
communities, particularly low-income and minority populations, have been
excluded from the Superfund decisionmaking process was one "driving force"
behind Superfund reform. 4 The communities complained that their opportunities
for involvement in site cleanup activities came too late in the process. 5 Thus,
section 102 of the bill creates a Community Working Group at each Superfund
44. Id. § 6.
45. Id.
46. H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
47. Id. § 3(d)(1). The affected population consisted of individuals of African, Hispanic, Asian,
Native American, Pacific Island or Native Alaskan ancestry. Id.
48. Id. § 3(b).
49. Id. § 3(b)(2).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
51. H.R. 1925, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
52. Id
53. S. REP. No. 349, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1994).
54. Id. at 9.
55. Id.
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facility to advise the lead agency about community preferences for cleanup and
seek broad-based community support for remedial decisions affecting land use. 6
Each state would have a Citizens Information and Access Office to serve as a
clearinghouse for information regarding sites and to provide information in a
manner easily understood by target communities. 7
The bill further incorporates provisions intended to help achieve
environmental justice for persons near Superfund sites by expanding the list of
factors the President can consider when evaluating a facility for listing on the
National Priority List ("NPL") 8 EPA would be allowed "to group together for
scoring purposes two or more facilities based on a finding that the facilities affect
the same community."'59 Furthermore, the Act would have directed EPA to
identify five facilities in each region where environmental justice concerns may
warrant special attention; these facilities would be accorded priority for listing and
scoring on the NPL.6 A biennial study of environmental justice issues is also
required to compare priority-setting, response actions, and public participation
activities based on population, race, ethnicity, and income characteristics."
Although the federal government has responded to claims of
environmental inequity, its response has centered around gathering and studying
data on the characteristics of communities alleging environmental inequities to
determine the extent of the problem. Proving that a problem exists is an
appropriate governmental task; however, the government's failure to do more
leaves victims living with the negative health and environmental impacts of
having an unwanted hazardous facility in their neighborhood. The Superfund
amendments, however, do begin to address the inadequacy of a siting process that
tends to exclude low-income and minority populations from cleanup decisions.
These communities are also alienated from the decisionmaking process for the
siting of waste facilities.62 Thus, residents in these neighborhoods must seek other
forums in which to struggle to protect themselves from the adverse effects of
living in close proximity to toxic-producing facilities.
56. Id. at 10-11.
57. Id. at 11.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The Report explained that these and other provisions were necessary to address concerns
that Superfund is disproportionately ineffective and discriminatorily implemented. The Report
mentioned a National Law Journal study showing that permanent treatment remedies were selected
22% more frequently than containment remedies at sites surrounding white communities. Id.
62. See Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need for a Disparate
Impact Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility Siting Decisions, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 211, 231-47 (1994). Saleem discusses federal and state notice requirements for siting a
hazardous waste facility and illustrates how the current construction of such notice requirements
tends to undermine public participation in the siting process. Id.
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IX. THE FAILURE OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS iN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
CASES
African American plaintiffs seeking remedies outside the realm of the
federal government regulation have brought judicial challenges to the siting of
unwanted facilities, claiming that they have been discriminated against because
of their race. 3 No plaintiff, however, has prevailed using an equal protection
argument.64  Residents opposing facilities and raising issues of environmental
discrimination have little or no trouble showing that the decision to locate a
facility in their community will negatively impact the health and safety of the
residents and that the decision will have a disproportionate impact on a particular
race.65 Rather, the success of their suits is impeded by surmounting the burden
of showing discriminatory intent.6 6  Showing irreparable harm and
disproportionate impact are not sufficient evidence of a discriminatory purpose
to prevail in an equal protection claim. 7
In one of the most noted cases involving a claim of denial of equal
protection in a siting decision, Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.,
African American residents of an East Houston, Texas, community contested the
decision of the Texas Department of Health ("TDH") to grant a permit to
Southwestern Waste Management to operate a solid waste facility in their
neighborhood. 8 The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, contending that
the decision was racially motivated in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.69 The
plaintiffs advanced two theories of liability: (1) that TDH's approval of the
permit was part of a pattern or practice by the department of discriminating in the
placement of solid waste sites, and (2) that TDH's approval of the permit, in the
context of the historical placement of solid waste sites and the events surrounding
the application, constituted discrimination." The court permitted the plaintiffs to
63. Cole, supra note 6, at 1992-93.
64. Id. at 1993.
65. See, e.g., infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
66. Courts hearing environmental racism cases have used the five factors recommended by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977), for establishing discriminatory purpose: (1) the impact of the official
action and whether it bears more heavily on one race than another, (2) the historical background
of the decision and whether it reveals a series of official actions taken by the commission for
invidious purposes; (3) the sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision; (4) any
departures, substantive or procedural, from the normal decision-making process; and (5) the
legislative or administrative history of the challenged decision.
67. See id. at 269-71.
68. 482 F. Supp. 673, 675 (S.D. Tex. 1979). The subdivision has been described as a suburban
neighborhood of African American homeowners, where 83% of the residents owned their homes.
Robert Bullard, EnvironmentalJusticeforAllI, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
& COMMUNMES OF COLOR 3, 4 (Robert Bullard ed., 1994).
69. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 674-75.
70. Id. at 677-78.
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offer statistical proof in support of their theories, but it found the data insufficient
to prove discriminatory intent and thus insufficient to prove the substantial
likelihood of success required for a preliminary injunction.7
The data submitted to establish a pattern of discrimination examined the
minority population in the census tracts where TDH granted permits.7' The court
interpreted that data as showing that 58.8% of the sites granted permits by TDH
were located in census tracts with 25% or less minority population at the time of
their opening, and that 82.4% of the sites granted permits by TDH were located
in census tracts with 50% or less minority population at the time of their
opening.73 The court noted that more particularized data may have shown that
even those sites approved in predominantly white census tracts were actually
located in minority neighborhoods, but the available data did not show this.74
The court found the data submitted by the plaintiffs in support of its
second theory of liability similarly lacking.75 The plaintiffs focused on statistical
disparities indicating that the targeted area contained 15% of Houston's solid
waste sites but only 6.9% of its population.76 The plaintiffs argued that because
the target area was 70% minority, the statistical disparity must be attributable to
race discrimination.77 Again, the court looked to census tract data in rejecting the
statistics as evidence of discrimination, finding that half of the solid waste sites
in the target area were in census tracts with more than 70% white populations.78
The court denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction,
finding that plaintiffs had not established a substantial likelihood of proving that
TDH was motivated to issue the permit by purposeful discrimination.79 However,
the court was not entirely unmoved by the circumstances of the residents in the
71. Id. at 677. The court cited Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), and Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), as cases in which statistical proof could rise to the level that it,
alone, proves discriminatory intent. It held that the data here simply did not rise to that level.
72. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677-79.
73. Id. at 677.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 678.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. One unanswered question identified by the court concerned the location of the solid waste
sites located within each census tract. The plaintiffs produced evidence that, in one census tract
which was a predominantly white tract, the site was located next to an African American
community. The outcome of the case might have been different, the court stated, if that were true
of most sites in the predominantly white census tracts. Id. at 680. Although plaintiffs in Bean used
census tract data, researchers disagree about what is a "neighborhood" for citing purposes. Vicki
Been, What's Fairness Got To Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally
Undesirable Land Uses, CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1015 (1993). Been identifies as other
"neighborhoods" zip code areas, a municipality, or concentric circles drawn around undesirable land
uses. Id.
79. Id. at 681.
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community where the waste site was to be located, calling the decision
"insensitive," "illogical" and "unfortunate.
80
The court questioned the factors which entered into TDH's decision to
grant the permit.8" First, the location had previously been proposed as the site of
a similar facility, but the County Commissioners, who were then responsible for
the issuance of permits, denied the permit in 1971.82 Next, the site was being
placed within 1,700 feet of a predominantly black high school with no air
conditioning and only somewhat further from a residential neighborhood. 3 The
plaintiffs pointed out that the school had changed from a white school to one
whose body is predominantly minority. 4
The court expressed consternation about why the permit was granted:
Land use considerations alone would seem to militate against
granting this permit .... If this Court were TDH, it might very
well have denied this permit. It simply does not make sense to
put a solid waste site so close to a high school, particularly one
with no air conditioning. Nor does it make sense to put the land
site so close to a residential neighborhood. But I am not TDH
.... From the evidence before me, I can say that the plaintiffs
have established that the decision to grant the permit was both
unfortunate and insensitive.85
With some sympathy for the plight of the plaintiffs, the court held that the
plaintiffs had adequately established a substantial threat of irreparable injury.86
Damages could not adequately compensate for the injuries caused by the opening
of a solid waste facility in their neighborhood including the negative impact on
the land values, the tax base, the aesthetics, the health and safety of the
inhabitants, and the normal operation of the nearby high school. The threatened
injury to the plaintiffs would outweigh that to defendants, and the public interest
would be served by granting the plaintiffs an injunction. Unfortunately, despite
80. Id. at 680-81.
81. Id. at 679-80.
82. Id. at 679. The area then was "mostly white." Bullard, supra note 68, at 4.
83. Bean, 482 F. Supp at 679.
84. Id. That the high school was not equipped with air conditioning was not an insignificant point
in Houston's hot and humid climate. ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DDIE: RACE, CLASS, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 44 (1994). Windows were usually left open while school was in session.
Id. Moreover, seven other schools, all without air conditioning, were in the area. Id.
85. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679-680.
86. Id. at 677.
87. Id.
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the threatened irreparable injury, the plaintiffs could not overcome the weighty
burden of proving discriminatory purpose."8
Similarly, in East Bibb Twiggs NeighborhoodAssociation v. Macon-Bibb
County Planning & Zoning Commission,9 another United States District Court
found insufficient evidence to establish that a decision to locate a landfill in a
majority African American community was motivated by racial discrimination.
In that case, the county planning and zoning commission by approving an
application for a conditional use allowed the creation of a private landfill; a
decision which area residents alleged deprived them of equal protection of the
law.9" The landfill would be operated for non-putrescible waste, described as
non-garbage waste such as wood, wood by-products, paper products, metal goods,
tires, and refrigerators.9 The waste was located in a census tract containing a
60% black population.92 Initially, the Commission voted to deny the landfill
application for three reasons: (1) the proposed landfill would be located adjacent
to a predominantly residential area; (2) the increase in heavy truck traffic would
increase noise in the area; and (3) the additional trucks were undesirable in a
residential area (alluding to concerns that area residents raised about hazards to
children from increased truck traffic).93 On rehearing, citizens opposing the
landfill also expressed concerns "regarding the impact the landfill might have
upon the water in an area where many of the residents relied upon wells for their
household water."94 The Commission approved the application after the hearing
subject to certain conditions, including a restriction on the dumping of all but
non-putrescible material.95 The one negative vote was cast by a commissioner
citing the impropriety of reconsidering the application after initially denying it.96
The court upheld the Commission's decision to approve the landfill as a
conditional use finding that the decision was not motivated by an intent to
88. Bullard acknowledges three changes in how the city and state dealt with environmental issues
in the black community that resulted from the lawsuit: (1) the Houston city council passed a
resolution in 1980 that prohibited city owned trucks carrying solid waste from dumping at the
landfill; (2) the city council passed an ordinance restricting the construction of solid-waste sites near
public facilities such as schools; (3) the TDH updated its requirements for landfill permit applicants
to include detailed land-use, economic, and socio-demographic data on areas where they proposed
to site landfills. Bullard, supra note 68, at 44-45.
89. 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989).
90. Id. at 881.
91. Id. at 881 n.1.
92. Id. at 884.
93. Id. at 882.
94. Id. at 883.
95. Id
96. Id. at 883 n.4. This was not considered a violation of the Arlington Heights factor considering
any departures, substantive or procedural, from the normal decision making process. Id. at 886.
The court considered plaintiff's contentions regarding alleged procedural irregularities, including
that a rehearing was improperly granted, to be without merit. Id.
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discriminate against black persons.97 Unlike the court in Bean, this court
expressed no sympathy for the plight of residents living close to a landfill. The
court examined the Arlington Heights factors and found the first factor present:
The Commission's "decision to approve the landfill in census tract No. 133.02 of
necessity impacts greater upon the majority [African American] population."98
However, no clear pattern of racially motivated decisions was established by the
plaintiffs; the only other Commission-approved landfill was in a census tract
containing a majority white population.99 The court did not comment on the
plaintiffs' evidence that both census tracts, and thus both landfills, were located
within a county commission district where the population was roughly 70%
black. 00
The court could discern neither a series of actions taken by the
Commission for invidious purposes nor an event showing a relaxation or other
change in the standards applicable to the granting of a conditional use."'
Furthermore, it found no procedural flaws in fact-finding or the granting of a
rehearing even though one commissioner voted against the application because of
the impropriety of reconsidering the application.' 2 The conditions placed on the
operation of the landfill would have to suffice as protection for the area residents
from any hazards of living in its vicinity.0 3
In RJS.E., Inc. v. Kay, a third United States District Court held that the
African American plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence that government
officials had intentionally discriminated on the basis of race 104 The Board of
Supervisors of King and Queen County, Virginia, voted to operate a regional
landfill in conjunction with a private entity, the Chesapeake Corporation. 5
Chesapeake would build the landfill on a Piedmont tract and use it for its own
waste disposal, and the county would operate it in exchange for free waste
disposal.0 6 The Board also adopted a resolution approving the Planning
97. Id. at 883 n.4.
98. Id. at 884.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 884-85.
101. Ma at 886.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 883. The landfill could not be operated as a public health hazard or a nuisance, nor
could any hazardous waste be deposited at the landfill. Id.
104. 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991).
105. Id. at 1147.
106. Id. at 1145. In 1988, the federal government ordered a redistricting of King and Queen
County, Virginia, which resulted in an increase in the number of county supervisors from three to
five. Robert W. Collin & William Harris, Sr., Race and Waste in Two Virginia Communities, in
CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRAssROOTs 95 (Robert D. Bullard
ed., 1993). The two new supervisors were African Americans. Id In Virginia, each county's board
of supervisors makes most of the landuse decisions. Id. The Board appoints a planning commission
which makes nonbinding recommendations. Id.
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Commission's recommendation that Piedmont Tract be rezoned from an
agricultural to an industrial area."0 7
Citizen opposition to the landfill was based on the feared reduction in the
quality of life by increased noise, dust and odor, decline in property values, and
interference with activities at a nearby church."0 8 The church was founded in
1869 by recently freed black slaves.'0 9 Its minister formed R.I.S.E., Inc.
(Residents Involved in Saving the Environment), a bi-racial community
organization created for the purpose of opposing the proposed landfill."0
A demographic analysis of the proposed landfill site showed that 64% of
the population living within a half-mile radius of the site was black, as were
twenty-one of the twenty-six families living along the route where most of the
landfill-bound traffic would travel."' The population within the vicinity of three
other landfills was also analyzed:
[(1)] The Mascot site landfill was sited in 1969 . . . . [T]he
estimated racial composition of the population living within a
one-mile radius of the site at its development was 100% black.
* . . [A] black church was located within two miles of the
landfill.
[(2)] The Dahlgren landfill was sited in 1971. An estimated 90-
95% of the residents living within a two-mile radius of it [were]
black.
[(3)] The Owenton landfill was sited in 1977 . . . . [A]n
estimated 100% of the residents living within a half-mile radius
of the landfill were black .... [A] black church [was] located
one mile from the landfill." 2
One other landfill, the King Land landfill, was located in a predominantly
white residential area; it was called an environmental disaster from its inception
by the court."' At the time of its inception, the County had no zoning ordinance
107. R.iS.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1147.
108. Id. These are all activities that could be raised in a nuisance suit. See, e.g., Southeast Ark.
Landfill, Inc. v. State of Ark., 858 S.W.2d 665 (Ark. 1993) (finding that off-loading of waste at a
landfill constituted a nuisance because of offensive odors); Padilla v. Lawrence, 685 P.2d 964 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1984) (annoyance, discomfort, and inconvenience from odors, noise and flies of manure
processing plant was a nuisance).
109. Collin & Harris, supra note 106, at 96.
110. R.LS.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1147-48. The church had subsidized an inadequately funded school
for black children for many years and is described as the "anchor" of the county's black community.
Collin & Harris, supra note 106, at 96.
111. R1S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1148.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1149.
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and thus no county approval was necessary for its operation." 4 After the County
implemented a zoning ordinance, King Land
sought permission to operate the landfill under the ordinance, but permission was
denied because the landfill was not a "nonconforming use" as defined in the
ordinance. "5 King Land's application for a variance was also denied on the
grounds that "the landfill operation would result in a significant decline in the
property values of the adjacent properties and that King Land had ignored
environmental, health, safety, and welfare concerns."" 6
In light of this demographic analysis, the court, without any discussion,
held that the placement of landfills in King and Queen County from 1969 to the
present had a disproportionate impact on black residents." 7 But, like the courts
in Bean and East Bibb, the court found no sufficient evidence of discriminatory
intent, though the only landfill located in a white residential area was barred from
continued operation."' The court found nothing "suspicious" or "unusual" about
the Board's decision, stating that the Supervisors appeared "to have been more
concerned about the economic and legal plight of the County as a whole than the
sentiments of residents who opposed the placement of the landfill in their
neighborhood.""' 9 Furthermore, "the Equal Protection Clause does not impose an
affirmative duty to equalize the impact of official decisions on different racial
groups.' 20
In an administrative Clean Air Act case, an Environmental Appeals Board
at EPA found no support for a claim of racially discriminatory intent when the
state of Michigan issued a permit for construction of a power steam electric plant
in a predominantly African American neighborhood in Flint, Michigan.' The
facility was designed to bum several types of wood waste including demolition
debris, pallets, dunnage, construction waste, tree trimmings, and sawmill
residue.22 As a new major stationary source of air pollution, the proposed plant
was required under the Clean Air Act to obtain an air pollution permit before
beginning operation.
2 1
The Society of Afro-American People argued that the issuance of the
permit represented "governmental environmental racism" because the facility
would be located near a predominantly African American neighborhood.2 4 The
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1150.
120. Id.
121. In re Genesee Power Station Ltd. Partnership, PSD Appeal Nos. 93-1 through 93-7, 1993 WL
484880 (E.P.A. Oct. 22, 1993).
122. Id. at *2.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *4.
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Society claimed that the manner in which the public hearings were held evidenced
environmental racism, in that "the inability for people of color.., to attend or
be involved in the hearings properly, is a civil rights concern."' 25 The Society
noted that a hearing for a different, incinerator in a rural farm area was held
immediately before the hearing for the permit for the Flint power plant and
contended that that permit was denied because of opposition from white residents
of the surrounding community.'26 The executive director of the Society alleged
that one of the commissioners stated: "[I]f the people don't want this in their
community we shouldn't put it there, because I sure wouldn't want it in my
community."'27
The Appeals Board found no support for that contention in the minutes
and declared that the Commission had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
denying the permit.'28 It held that the record revealed no evidence of racially
discriminatory intent when granting the Flint permit.'29 The Board noted that the
permit was not a license to threaten their health and safety because the emissions
allowed under the permit would meet all applicable air quality regulations, and,
in the case of some pollutants, the emissions would be below levels determined
to protect human health. 30 Furthermore, the Board wrote, the permit was being
remanded so that the Commission could consider whether fuel cleaning-the
removal of wood waste that is painted or treated with lead-bearing
substances-should be required to further reduce lead emissions.' The Afican
American residents in that Flint neighborhood would have to be satisfied with
such protection.
The difficulty of proving discriminatory intent in siting decisions shows
the "limited utility" of current civil rights doctrines in solving environmental
equity problems.' This limited utility has given rise to suggestions that residents
of areas where landfills and dumps are located or planned should consider
alternative causes of action including common law causes of action based in tort.
125. Id. at *5.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id at *6.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black Brown, Red, andPoisoned, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION,
supra note 68, at 53, 61 (1994). See also, Godsil, supra note 9, at 416-21; Robert M. Frye,
Environmental Injustice: The Failure of American Civil Rights and Environmental Law To Provide
Equal Protection from Pollution, 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 53 (1993); Cole, supra note 6.
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H. THE DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATORY NUISANCE
When the courts in Bean'33 and in East Bibb'34 recited the harms that
could follow from the placement of a solid waste facility in a residential
community, they listed harms usually found in nuisance suits-threats to the
health and safety of the inhabitants, adverse impacts on aesthetics and land values,
and increased noise, traffic, dust and odors. 135  The plaintiffs in Bean had
adequately demonstrated a substantial threat of irreparable injury, thus damages
were not adequate compensation." 6 Because the plaintiffs could not show
discriminatory purpose, however, they would have to suffer the harms of living
with a solid waste facility in their residential neighborhood and in close proximity
to a high school without air conditioning." 7
The doctrine of anticipatory nuisance could provide plaintiffs similarly
situated with another legal theory with which to fight the placement of a waste
facility within their neighborhoods. Plaintiffs could seek an injunction prohibiting
the construction of the facility because of a "threat of sufficient seriousness and
imminence to justify coercive relief."' 3' Anticipatory nuisance doctrine would
present plaintiffs with the most desirable of results-the prevention of harm
before it actually occurs. Even if the court refused to grant complete injunctive
relief by prohibiting the siting of the facility in their neighborhood, plaintiffs will
have forced some review of the facility and may be awarded an injunction
requiring the facility to maintain certain standards or provide particular
safeguards. 139
A. Fundamentals of Nuisance Law
Under the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance, a defendant may be restrained
from conducting an activity where it is highly probable that the activity will lead
133. 482 F. Supp. 673.
134. 706 F. Supp. 880.
135. For example, in Padilla v. Lawrence, 685 P.2d 964 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984), the court upheld
a private nuisance where the plant's operation resulted in plaintiff's exposure to odors, dust, noise
and flies. Compensation was allowed for annoyance, discomfort and inconvenience, but not for a
decline in property values. Id. at 969.
136. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677.
137. Id. at 680.
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 933 cmt. b (1977).
139. For example, the Supreme Court of Kansas set aside an injunction to prohibit the construction
of a baseball diamond and a football field provided that the defendant construct a fence and
protective screen around the area; it also granted an injunction against the installation of floodlights,
a public address system, a concession stand, and the playing of varsity football and baseball games.
Vickridge First and Second Addition Homeowners Ass'n v. Catholic Diocese, 510 P.2d 1296, 1307
(Kan. 1973).
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to a nuisance. 4 ' A "nuisance" is defined as some interference with the use and
enjoyment of land. 4' It does not require a possessory interference.'42 This type
of nuisance is private nuisance, "a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest
in the private use and enjoyment of land."'' Under the private nuisance doctrine,
the harm necessary for nuisance liability must be significant.' "The law does
not concern itself with trifles, or seek to remedy all the petty annoyances and
disturbances of everyday life in a civilized community."' 45 Nuisance law takes
into account the location, character, and habits of the particular community when
determining the significance of the harn.' 46
In the case of a private nuisance, the interference with plaintiff's use and
enjoyment must be unreasonable.'47 An interference is "unreasonable" when the
gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct. 48 In determining
the gravity of harm, factors considered include the extent of the harm involved,
the character of the harm involved, the social value that the law attaches to the
type of use or enjoyment invaded, the suitability of the particular use or
enjoyment invaded to the character of the locality, and the cost to the person
harmed of avoiding the harm.'49 The utility of the conduct causing the invasion
is determined by the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of
the conduct, the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality, and the
impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion. 5' This balancing of the
140. W. PAGE KEATON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 89 (5th ed. 1984).
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. d (1979).
142. Id.
143. Id. § 821D. Another type of nuisance is public nuisance, an unreasonable interference with
a right common to the general public. Id. § 821B. Circumstances that may sustain a finding of a
public nuisance include conduct involving significant interference with the public health and safety.
Id. § 821B(2)(a). To recover for damages in an individual action for public nuisance, the harm
suffered must be of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public. Id. §821C.
Traditionally, if a member of the public has not suffered damages different in kind and cannot
maintain an action for damages, he also has no standing to maintain an action for injunctive relief.
Id. § 821C cmt. j.
144. Id. § 821F.
145. KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, § 88.
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F cmt. e (1977).
147. Keeton et al., supra note 140, § 88.
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1977). An interference is also "unreasonable"
when "this and similar harm to others caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of
compensating for the harm would not make the continuation of the conduct unfeasible." See
KEETON Er AL., supra note 140, § 88A. The two clauses highlight the distinctions courts make
between a nuisance suit seeking injunctive relief prohibiting the activity and a suit for compensation
for the harm imposed. Id. The action for damages does not seek to stop the activity; it seeks instead
to place on the activity the cost of compensating for the harm it causes. Id. The financial burden
of this cost is therefore a significant factor in determining whether the conduct of causing the harm
without paying for it is unreasonable. Id.
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (1977).
150. Id. § 828.
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equities for injunctive relief does not have to occur only after the nuisance
activity has commenced. A private nuisance may be enjoined where harm is
threatened that would be significant if it occurred."'
B. Benefits of Anticipatory Nuisance
The major benefit of the anticipatory nuisance doctrine in cases of siting
of facilities is the prevention of harm before it occurs. Prevention of irreparable
harms to the environment is particularly suited to injunctive relief under the
doctrine because of the difficulty of remediating the environment. For example,
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that injunctive relief was proper where
plaintiffs showed that pollution of their underground water would most probably
result from the operation of a landfill nearby.'52 The court noted that "the
difficulty, complexity and costliness of remedying ground water contamination
is well documented" and that, "once seriously contaminated, groundwater is often
rendered unusable and cleaning it up is often unsuccessful."' 53 The balance of
equities favored the nearby landowners. Due to the potential long-term effects
of groundwater contamination, the injunction was granted.' Likewise, opposition
to the siting of the landfill in East Bibb was based partially on the impact the
landfill may have had on the water in an area where many of the residents relied
on wells for water.'55 The plaintiffs there, however, were unsuccessful in halting
the construction of a landfill because of their inability to prove discriminatory
intent, 56 an element they would not have had to prove under the anticipatory
nuisance doctrine.
Another benefit of the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance is the prevention
of economic waste. 7 If a nuisance is imminent but the plaintiff's only available
remedy is to wait for the nuisance to occur before seeking injunctive relief, the
defendant may waste resources by investing in an activity which will likely be
prohibited after the fact. Anticipatory nuisance would prevent such a waste of the
defendant's resources. 58
151. Id. § 821F cmt. b.
152. Sharp v. 251st Street Landfill, Inc., 810 P.2d 1270 (Okla. 1991), overruledon other grounds,
Dulaney v. Oklahoma State Dep't of Health, 868 P.2d 676 (Okla. 1993).
153. Id. at 1279 n.15.
154. Id. at 1281.
155. East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 883.
156. Id.
157. Andrew Sharp, An Ounce of Prevention: Rehabilitating the Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine,
15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 627, 630 (1988).
158. Id.
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C. Threatened Nuisance Per Se or Nuisance Per Accidens
Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief under the doctrine of anticipatory
nuisance face their first obstacle when some courts require that the enjoined
activity be a nuisance per se.'59 Generally, unless a proposed use is a nuisance
per se, an injunction will not readily, be granted to restrain an anticipatory
nuisance.160 A nuisance per se is an act, instrument, or structure which is a
nuisance at all times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or
surroundings. 6' Nuisances per se have included prostitution'62 and gambling
houses,'63 but not a football field or baseball field,' a hog-buying station'65or a
supermarket.'66 Unfortunately for plaintiffs in cases involving the siting of waste
or toxic-producing facilities, nuisances per se have not included the storage of
petroleum products in residential areas,' 67 the trucking of materials in and out of
a power plant facility,'68 a wood treatment plant, 169 or a sanitary landfill. 70
Because activities or structures that are not illegal are generally not
considered nuisances per se, plaintiffs in cases of the siting of waste or toxic-
producing facilities must show that the activity, operation, or structure of which
they are complaining will be a nuisance per accidens if it is allowed to operate. 7 '
A nuisance per accidens is an activity or structure which becomes or may become
a nuisance based on the facts, circumstances, and surroundings, and as an activity
not by its nature a nuisance, but one which may become a nuisance by reason of
the locality, surroundings, or the manner in which it may be conducted or
managed. 72
Courts applying the anticipatory nuisance doctrine hesitate to grant
injunctions when the activity or structure being complained of is a nuisance
accidens and not a nuisance per se.'73 These courts apply the general rule that,
when the thing complained of is not a nuisance per se but may or may not
become a nuisance under the circumstances, equity will not interfere on the
159. See id.
160. Id at 631.
161. Duffv. Morgantown EnergyAssocs., 421 S.E.2d 253, 257 (W.V. 1992); Vickridge, 510 P.2d
at 1302.
162. 58 AM. JUR. 2d Nuisances § 196 (1989).
163. 66 C.J.S. Nuisance § 3 (1951 & Supp. 1994).
164. Vickridge, 510 P.2d at 1302.
165. Moody v. Lundy Packing Co., 172 S.E.2d 905 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970).
166. Strong v. Winn-Dixie Stores Inc., 125 S.E.2d 628 (S.C. 1962).
167. Prauner v. Battle Creek Coop. Creamery, 113 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Neb. 1962).
168. Duff, 421 S.E.2d at 260.
169. McCord v. Green, 555 So. 2d 743 (Ala. 1989).
170. Sharp, 810 P.2d at 1276 n.6.
171. McCord, 555 So. 2d at 745; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, § 88C.
172. Duff, 421 S.E.2d at 258 n.8.
173. See Sharp, supra note 157, at 630-31.
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presumption that a person entering into a legitimate business will conduct it in a
proper way so that it will not constitute a nuisance. 174 Where the anticipated
nuisance is doubtful, contingent, or conjectural, no injunctive relief will be
awarded. 75
D. Likelihood of Harm
For an injunction abating a threatened nuisance, courts vary on what
standard will be applied to the evidence of likelihood of harm that plaintiffs must
produce to be awarded equitable relief. One test requires a plaintiff seeking to
enjoin a prospective nuisance to prove that the proposed conduct will constitute
a nuisance "beyond all ground of fair questioning."'76 The court in Duff v.
Morgantown Energy Associates explained that the standard required the party
seeking to enjoin a prospective nuisance to establish by "conclusive evidence"
that the danger be impending and imminent and that the effect be certain. 177 In
applying the standard, the court required the plaintiff who complained of
increased traffic, noise, dirt and pollution from the trucking of materials to and
from a power plant to show that the proposed trucking operation either threatened
devastating harm or was certain to result in serious damages or irreparable
injury. 178 Plaintiff could show neither "beyond all ground of fair questioning,"
thus the lower court's order enjoining the trucking of materials was reversed. 79
Another more widely used standard permits the granting of injunctive
relief for an anticipated nuisance where a nuisance will "necessarily result" from
the contemplated act."' As under the previously mentioned test, the plaintiff has
the burden of showing a danger of a real and immediate injury occurring. 8' The
inevitability of a nuisance must be shown; mere speculation is not enough.'82 In
Village of Goodfield v. Jamison, plaintiff sought to enjoin the construction of a
hog transfer station, fearing possible offensive odors and increased traffic, noise,
flies, and pests. 3 However, the plaintiff presented no evidence on traffic, and
the defendant countered plaintiff's evidence as to the odor reaching the village
due to prevailing winds and as to the noise from the loading and unloading of
animals; all evidence concerning the flies and pests indicated that proper operation
174. See McCord, 555 So. 2d at 745; Strong, 125 S.E.2d at 633; Duff, 421 S.E.2d at 258.
175. See Strong, 125 S.E.2d at 633; Duff, 421 S.E.2d at 258.
176. Duff, 421 S.E.2d at 258.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 260.
179. Id. at 263.
180. See, e.g, Strong, 125 S.E.2d 628. See also Roach v. Combined Util. Comm'n, 351 S.E.2d
168 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986); Village of Goodfield v. Jamison 544 N.E.2d 1229 (III. Ct App. 1989).
181. See Village of Goodfield, 544 N.E.2d at 1233.
182. Id.
183. Id at 1229.
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of the station would limit any problems."8 4 Thus, the court considered the
plaintiffs fears speculative.' Before reversing the lower court's decision, the
court did remind the plaintiff that if its "worst fears came true," it could seek a
remedy at that time.'86
Courts consider the circumstances and surroundings when determining
whether an activity is a nuisance per accidens.'87 Similarly, when determining
whether a nuisance would necessarily result from a proposed activity, courts
consider the circumstances and surroundings of the normal operation of the
activity or structure.188 Thus, the proposed operation of a supermarket was not
enjoined in Strong v. Winn-Dixie18 9 because a nuisance would not necessarily
result from the normal operation of a supermarket in that particular
neighborhood. 9 The court noted that the plaintiffs did not reside, in a secluded
residential area; they were in close proximity to a business area with the attendant
noises and congestion. 9' The issue of the prospective nuisance must be
determined in light of those facts.'92 Again, the higher court reversed the trial
court's finding of an anticipated nuisance."'
That a business could possibly be operated normally in such a way as not
to constitute a nuisance was also the deciding factor in Roach v. Combined Utility
Commission. "' The plaintiffs in Roach sought to enjoin construction of a waste
water treatment plant by the city's utility commission because it would be
unhealthy and unsightly and would result in odors, noise, flies and vermin in their
community.'95 In upholding the trial court's decision to deny plaintiffs request
for an injunction, the court quoted the Commission's expert that the modem
design would eliminate noise "'unless you were standing right up next to the
equipment. i3' 96  The expert further testified that, with proper operation and
maintenance, the plant would function "without [the] nuisance of the odor, noise,
flies, and vermin."' 97
A. related standard requires a plaintiff seeking an injunction to
demonstrate to a "reasonable certainty" that the proposed activity would be a
184. Id. at 1234.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1235.
187. See Sharp, supra note 157, at 630-3 1.
188. Id.
189. Strong, 125 S.E.2d at 628.
190. Id. at 633-35.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 634.
193. Id. at 635.
194. 351 S.E.2d 168.
195. Id. at 169.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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nuisance.' 8 In one instance, the Texas Court of Appeals upheld the award of an
injunction for the threatened nuisance of a parking lot and emphasized that a
nuisance is to be determined by considering all circumstances, not merely the
thing itself.'99 The court stated that "[e]very case must stand on its own
footing."2 "0 The plaintiffs introduced sufficient evidence that the location, time,
and manner of use of the proposed parking lot would constitute a nuisance.20'
Residents expressed concern that access to the proposed parking lot would cause
more traffic, increase the opportunity for injury to neighborhood children,
heighten the chance of inebriated drivers, and escalate crime.20 2 The jury
concluded from the evidence that the operation of the parking lot in this particular
neighborhood was reasonably certain to be a nuisance.20 3
The two states, Georgia and Alabama, that have codified the anticipatory
nuisance doctrine have incorporated the "reasonably certain" standard into their
statutes. 0 ' The Alabama statute authorizes an injunction "[w]here the
consequences of a nuisance about to be erected or commenced will be irreparable
in damages and such consequences are not merely possible but to a reasonable
degree certain."2  Two cases applying the statute reached different results,
demonstrating the confusion surrounding the level of proof required to establish
the imminence of a nuisance regardless of how the standard is phrased.20 6
In upholding an injunction of the construction of an open lagoon-type
sewer treatment plant, the Supreme Court of Alabama in Town of Hokes Bluff v.
Butler"7 focused on the location of the plant when deciding that a nuisance was
reasonably certain to result. Alabama followed the general principle that "'there
can be no abatable nuisance for doing in a proper manner what is authorized by
law.""'20 The court did not question the soundness of the rule but noted that the
198. See Freedman v. Briarcroft Property Owners, 776 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)
(citing O'Daniel v. Libal, 196 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946)).
199. Id. (citing 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 8 (1950)).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 217.
202. Ia
203. Id
204. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
205. ALA. CODE § 6-5-125 (1975 & Supp. 1994). The State of Georgia also has codified the
doctrine: "Where the consequences of a nuisance about to be erected or commenced will be
irreparable damage and such consequence is not merely possible but to a reasonable degree certain,
an injunction may be issued to restrain the nuisance before it is completed." GA. CODE ANN. § 41-
2-4 (1994).
206. Compare infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text with infra notes 224-31 and
accompanying text.
207. 404 So. 2d 623, 625-26 (Ala. 1981).
208. Id. at 625 (quoting Fricke v. City of Guntersville, 36 So. 2d 321 (1948)).
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obverse was true: if a project were not to be operated in a proper manner, then
the nuisance was abatable." 9 The issue becomes what is "proper.""21
As stated, location was the determinative factor in the Hokes Bluffcase.21'
The proposed open lagoon was to be located near the banks of a river and next
to a public boat landing ramp in a designated "flood prone area. 212 The state's
water commission discouraged the location of lagoons in areas likely to flood.2"3
An investigation by the Geological Survey of Alabama stated: "This site is
considered poor for but probably adaptive to the construction of the proposed
lagoon."2 4 In light of the state's findings, the court held that the plaintiffs had
presented enough evidence to show with reasonable certainty that the construction
of a lagoon-type facility at that particular location was reasonably certain to
constitute a nuisance.
215
Eight years later, the Alabama Supreme Court in McCordv. Green"6 held
that the statute applied in the Hokes Bluff case required a complainant to show to
a reasonable degree of certainty that the act or structure he sought to enjoin would
be a nuisance per se, a nuisance at all times and under all circumstances,
regardless of location or surroundings, and not a nuisance per accidens. 217 This
holding made plaintiffs' cases more difficult to prove because courts would no
longer engage in an examination of the circumstances of the proposed activity as
was done in Hokes Bluff-where the court analyzed the plant as a nuisance per
accidens and gave strong consideration to its location.218 An activity would have
to be a nuisance at all locations and under all circumstances, a requirement
usually satisfied only by illegal activities. Thus, the court in McCord held that
the operation of a wood treatment plant in a rural area was not a nuisance per
se. 2 1 Plaintiffs would have to wait for the plant to begin operation and then
return to court to demonstrate that the plant was in fact a nuisance, a sentiment
often expressed when courts fail to enjoin an anticipatory nuisance.
E. Severity of Harm
In applying the anticipatory nuisance doctrine, courts emphasize the
imminence of the threatened harm, rarely considering the severity of the
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See infra note 219 and accompanying text
212. Hokes Bluff, 404 So. 2d at 626.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 55 So. 2d 743 (Ala. 1990).
217. Id at 746.
218. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
219. McCord, 555 So. 2d at 746.
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anticipated harm.220 Shifting the analysis to the level of harm could sway a court
to enjoin an activity as an anticipated nuisance, particularly in environmental
cases where harm is often irreparable due to the improbability of returning the
environment to its previous state.2 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma balanced
the likelihood of harm with the severity of the harm when it decided to uphold
the grant of a temporary injunction in Sharp v. 251st Street Landfill, Inc.222 The
proposed landfill would primarily accept domestic, not hazardous, waste.223 The
cells of the site where waste would be deposited would be lined with a three foot
clay liner to provide protection for groundwater in the area.224 Residents in the
area of the landfill had wells on their land for domestic purposes, livestock, and
agricultural crops.2' An expert testified that the wells most likely tapped into an
aquifer under the landfill site.226 He also testified that once groundwater is
polluted, it is very difficult to restore it to usable quality.227
The court noted that the difficulty, complexity, and costliness of
remedying groundwater contamination is well-documented and concluded that,
once seriously contaminated, groundwater is often rendered unusable and cleaning
it up is often unsuccessful.228 Upholding the temporary injunction, the court
found that the evidence supported a determination of irreparable injury: "[W]e
have recognized generally invasions of water rights are subject to injunction..
• Furthermore, pollution of a groundwater source is a type of environmental
damage relatively unsusceptible to remediation. 229  The balance of equities
favored the plaintiffs because of the long term effects contamination could have
on their water sources."a The court did note, however, that it was not prejudging
the propriety of a permanent injunction and that an injunction should be limited
to the nuisance-creating characteristics of a business; the entire business operation
should not be shut down if the nuisance-creating characteristics can be
eliminated.23
220. See Charles J. Doane, Comment, Beyond Fear: Articulating a Modern Doctrine in
Anticipatory Nuisance for Enjoining Improbable Threats of Catastrophic Harm, 17 B.C. ENVTh.
AFF. L. REV. 441, 455, 463-68 (1990).
221. See generally ic at 468-72.
222. 810 P.2d 1270 (Okla. 1990), overruledinpart byDulaney v. Oklahoma State Dep't of Health,
826 P.2d 676 (Okla. 1993) (observing that the legislature had effectively "obliterated" Sharp of any
meaning upon passage of 63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-2415 (1991)).
223. d at 1279.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1279 n.15 (citation omitted).
229. Id. at 1281.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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In one other case holding promise for the successful use of the
anticipatory nuisance doctrine, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in Village of
Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., that it was highly probable that a chemical
waste disposal site would bring about a substantial injury and upheld the trial
court's decision to enjoin operation of the site. 32 Residents presented evidence
not only as to dust and odors from the site, but also of the toxic nature of
substances deposited at the site, exposure to which could result in pulmonary
diseases, cancer, brain damage and birth defects. 233 The site was built above an
abandoned coal mine, thus increasing the likelihood of an accident.23a The court
thought it "sufficiently clear" that it was highly probable that the site would
constitute a nuisance and that the highly toxic chemical wastes at the site would
escape and contaminate the air, water, and ground around the site: "A court does
not have to wait for it to happen before it can enjoin such a result... Under
these circumstances, if a court can prevent any damage from occurring, it should
do so. 235
The court in Village of Wilsonville was faced with a high likelihood of
severe harm occurring. In a concurring opinion, Justice Ryan argued for a
standard for anticipatory nuisance that allowed for a lesser showing of probability
of harm when the potential harm was so devastating.236 He suggested the rule
that if the harm that may result is so severe, a lesser probability of it occurring
should be required for injunctive relief. 7 Conversely, if the threatened harm is
less severe, a greater possibility that it will happen should be demonstrated by the
party seeking to enjoin an activity.3 Plaintiffs may be entitled to protection not
only from "the nearly certain effects of a proposed activity, but also from the
catastrophic, yet less certain, effects of a proposed activity."239
Likewise, the severity of harm was a determinative factor in a decision
by the Supreme Court of Louisiana to issue a qualified injunction preventing a
chemical waste facility in Salter v. B. WS. Corp.240 The evidence established the
probability that disposal of chemical waste by defendant without adequate
precautions would pollute a neighboring well, posing a threat to the health and
safety of the family using the well for water. However, the court was also
convinced that the waste facility could be operated safely if the defendant
followed a recommendation that the trenches into which the wastes were
232. 426 N.E.2d 824, 836-37 (I11. 1981).
233. Id. at 828.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 837.
236. Id. at 842.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Sharp, supra note 157, at 642.
240. 290 So. 2d 821 (La. 1974).
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deposited be lined with an impermeable material.241 The court issued a qualified
injunction ordering the facility to comply with the recommendation since the
consequences of a failure to exercise great care to prevent the escape of poisonous
materials were so serious.242
The lower court in Salter had issued a broad injunction which was
narrowed on appeal.243 In several other cases, trial courts have enjoined
anticipatory nuisances that were not upheld on appeal.244 This pattern underscores
the uncertainty with which the standards of the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance
are applied. Although courts have articulated standards such as "necessarily
results" and "reasonable certainty," there is a general lack of predictability as to
what factors courts will consider and how courts will weigh those factors.2 45 For
example, some courts will only consider the likelihood of occurrence, while
others will take into account the severity of harm.2 46 Furthermore, the pattern also
emphasizes the very factual and circumstantial nature of the doctrine. Plaintiffs
in one case were able to enjoin the construction of a parking lot,247 while a
plaintiff in another instance was unable to prevent the construction of a nuclear
power plant just over one mile from his residence. 8 Such uncertainty should
lead residents suffering from the harms of environmental discrimination in siting
decisions to approach cautiously, but not exclude, the doctrine of anticipatory
nuisance as one legal theory under which to seek relief.
IV. CONCLUSION: USING THE DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATORY NUISANCE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Use of the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance by citizens wanting to litigate
environmental discrimination claims rewards the successful plaintiff with the
optimal result: prevention of the harm by stopping the construction and operation
of the facility. Residents of the East Houston, Texas community in Bean
demonstrated a substantial threat of irreparable injury.249 The court found that
damages could not adequately compensate for the injuries caused by the opening
241. Id. at 824.
242. Id. at 825.
243. Id. at 822.
244. Duff, 421 S.E.2d at 253; McCord, 555 So. 2d at 743; S.M. McAshon v. River Oaks Country
Club, 646 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing a decision that proposed use of parking lot
by golf course would necessarily create a nuisance); McQuade v. Tucson Tiller Apartments, 543
P.2d 150 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that an anticipated nuisance was too doubtful to uphold
part of an injunction enjoining the hauling of sand and gravel).
245. Sharp, supra note 157, at 642-43.
246. See id.
247. Freedman v. Briarcroft, 776 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
248. Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 237 N.W.2d 266 (Mich. 1975).
249. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677.
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of a solid waste facility in their neighborhood."' The threatened injuries included
a negative impact on the land values, tax base, aesthetics, and health and safety
of the inhabitants, and the operation of a nearby high school without air
conditioning would also be severely impacted.2"' Those residents convinced the
judge of the type of harm necessary to prove an anticipatory nuisance. Yet, the
facility was built because the plaintiffs could not prove the intent element of their
equal protection claim.252 The tort theory of anticipatory nuisance could have
given them another opportunity to stop the construction of the facility in their
community. On the other hand, the equal protection claim did allow them to
introduce evidence of discriminatory decision making, evidence crucial to
establishing the inequitable distribution of the nation's environmental degradation.
Generally, litigation of environmental claims under any theory is
expensive and time consuming because expert testimony is usually required to
prove causation and the extent of harm. However, plaintiffs alleging an actual
nuisance can seek injunctive relief for the more easily shown presence of odors,
flies, noise and increased traffic beyond a tolerable and safe level.253
Unfortunately, plaintiffs alleging a prospective nuisance may encounter difficulty
proving that an activity or structure is highly likely to be a nuisance without the
powerful evidence of the actual stench, vermin and traffic jams. Furthermore,
although courts have not expressly held that a higher probability of harm must be
shown when the harm is not severe, the decisions seem to imply that the courts
are more likely to find an anticipatory nuisance for a likelihood of substantial
injury to the occupants and their safe use of the land than for intolerable invasions
of the enjoyment of land. However, if the harm alleged includes health effects,
expert testimony will be required, and owners of facilities often have more
resources to acquire the scientists and technicians than do community groups.
Most courts also presume that an activity will be conducted in a proper manner.254
That presumption is difficult to overcome before operation of a facility has begun,
and overcoming it would again require the testimony of experts. Thus, bringing
an environmental discrimination suit under anticipatory nuisance law shifts the
focus of the allegations away from disparate impact and discriminatory intent in
the siting process to a more technical and factual discussion of causation and of
imminence and severity of harm.
250. Id. at 680.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. One of the advantages of nuisance in environmental litigation has been described as the
simplicity of showing that pollution "looks bad, smells bad, and does bad things." Ronald J.
Rychlak, Common-Law Remedies for Environmental Wrongs: The Role of Private Nuisance, 59
MIss. L.J. 657, 661 (1989).
254. See, e.g., Hokes Bluff, 404 So. 2d., at 625.
250 [Vol. 19:223
ANTICIPATORY NUISANCE DOCTRINE
While bringing suits under a claim of civil rights violations now has
questionable legal value, they do have political value.25 For example, the suits
bring attention to the lack of participation of communities of color in the
decisionmaking process and to the nationwide inequitable distribution of
environmental harms from waste facilities. Because an anticipatory nuisance is
often determined based on the particular location and manner of operation of each
proposed facility, the doctrine would not easily lend itself to a strategic approach
to litigation nationwide or to coordination among community groups. Cases
would be brought and facilities enjoined in a piecemeal manner. Furthermore,
successful challenges may be of little precedential value due to differences in the
facts and circumstances of each case.2 6
Some attorneys strongly recommend against lawsuits in general. They
consider the environmental justice struggle to be a political and economic battle,
and thus a legal response can be inappropriate.25 7 However, a case brought under
the anticipatory nuisance doctrine can offer plaintiffs some advantages. First, a
plaintiff has some chance of success. No plaintiff to date has been successful in
bringing a civil rights claim of environmental discrimination because of the
insurmountable burden of showing discriminatory intent. That problem is
unlikely to change without a change in the law. However, plaintiffs in
environmental cases of anticipatory nuisance have been successful in some
instances in enjoining the operation of landfills and other waste-producing
facilities. Thus, they have been successful in preventing the harm before it
occurs. Second, plaintiffs, if not awarded an injunction prohibiting construction,
may possibly obtain a qualified or modified injunction ordering certain safety
measures to be undertaken at the facility. Though not ideal, such relief may
afford a community some type of protection and provide another legal weapon
once operation of the facility begins. Third, the lawsuit can bring publicity and
can educate a community about the degradation caused by a facility and the
attendant harms incurred from living in close proximity to one. It could even
impact the political process and hasten the formation of an adequate government
response.
Litigation under any theory is costly and slow. Moreover, the plaintiff
must always be prepared for the loss of his or her claim and thus to suffer the
harms anyway. For communities exposed to a disproportionate burden of the
nation's environmental problems, the ideal solution is not only halting
environmental discrimination in the siting of waste facilities, but also halting the
need for those waste facilities in the first place.
255. See Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling, 21
FORnHAM URB. L.J. 523, 545 (1994).
256. See Freedman, 776 S.W.2d at 216.
257. Cole, supra note 255, at 524, 541.
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